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'TERRORISM : A GI.OBAL THREAT 
Ab. 14ziz?iusof, Suhary Aii 
TrlToisIn is said to he ustlig viuiencc to manipulate human's fear to achieve priYue 
agenda group of self-cwtered peop l i  The terrorist is self-appointed arbiters of what is  
A f scanning of tcnDrist jncidelits uvcr the past decadc o s:) indicates clearly that business 
1 particularI!; multinational coinpol-ties have bccn prefincd targets of numerous brmS of Lcnonsm 
in many nations. A more and more unsecured working cnviroilment in( reasingly 
nlultinarional companies :ind expatriates ;r\ a rIlp10r victim of ill2 game. They have become 
a favofiie instnlmrntal taiget of  terrorists hrcausa of pi~blic allegations frequently 
bV i 
gc)vemmnltal spokcsmm, religious organi~ations, and public interest gro~lps that they a;c i 
h r  various societal ills, heca~.lsc they have syr~lbolic propaganda value as agents of 1 
ifipel-i"ism, and because of t'nei~. high t:mbarrassment quotients for national govemmezls. 
Hence, this paper will highlight the ilaturc of terrorism. the reasons behind terrorism, the imprcl 1 
oftecronsm on business, and the preventive measures ought to be taken against t e ~ ~ o n s m .  1 1 
I 
! 
The risk of becoming thc victitn of tcrrorisrn is snlali. r2ccording to Copeland (1987). of the 
3,010 incidents of' terrorism worldwide in 1086, 703 were, attacks on corporations. mo:;tly i n  
Latin America; relatively few (only 6.7 attacks) were on American installations or personncl, 
according to data from f i i ~ r ~ s  that nionitor- terrorist activity. In the three most publici7,ed 
incidents, (the Iran hostages, the 7'WA hijr?ck and 14chille Laura), only two people were killed. 
According to the Stale De.pai-tnlent, of 28 million Americans V J ~ ~ O  ventured abroad i n  1985, only 
162 were wounded or. killed in terrorist incidents. 'ro compare the problem in perspective: on any 
given day, there are 3 1 .(I00 cornrnercial air-line flights arourld thc world, not counting the flights 
within the Soviet i i ~ ~ i o n  (which tloesn't give ( . J L I ~  numbers). 111 ! 983 there were more than 11.2 
nliliion flights worldvvidt. on scheduled ;~i:lines. If '   yo^^ cou~it  eve1-y terrorist attack on board 
airliners in the last 10 y::3rs. ! ~ I C ! L I ~ ~ I I ~  I~ijackings,, you i i r~d  that t ~ l ~ ( ) r i ~ t ~  }lave struck fewer tha~i  
one in a million flights. 
The security r ~ f  American personnel abroad ha:; always been a concern for the I~~~ponsible 
organization hecause the traveler's exposure to I-isk is greater. A sulvey of 138 companies 
conducted on November. 1986 by the O\~erseas Security Advisol-y (:or.lncil according to (:opcl~"d 
(192;7), lound that covoratc securiQ directol.~. hy a tlvc-to-onc margin, claimed tenorism was 
their largest problem. .Records kept by B~~s iness  Kisks Risk Assessment 
in~ormation Sei-viccs shnln. that since 1054 b~isincsr firms and their enl[:lovees have been the 
leading targets o l  inierrsalional terrorism (Hasrick, 1989). Of more than 3,700 recorded tsrrorlst 
incidents in i988, more than 1,200 were directcd against business operations. ~ccording to 
Maddox (1990) (in Harvey, 1993), I,atri~ ,4merica ac,counted for mor-e half of all attacks on 
busii~esses; whereas, Western T'urope was responsible for nlore than one third. In a study 
corrductcd by tlir D e p a r t n ~ e ~ ~ l  of State (7 en or is^ nt~acki, 1'182 in iIal-vey. 1 ( , ( I ? ) ,  the distribution 
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st attacks against U.S. business from 1968 to 198 1, was consistent with the 
a. Latin American - 407 incidents; 
b. Western Europe - 176 attacks; 
c. Middle East and North Africa - 170 incidents; and 
d. North Americ,a - 153 reported terrorist acts. 
ithesis of democracy. In democracies, the governed elect their leaders, human rights are 
ected and political disputes are resolved politically, not violently. But the terrorist is a self- 
arbiter of what is right. As George Schultz says, "A terrorist has no patience and no 
rderly processes of democratic society;" rather, he seeks to impose his ideolomes 
nd, 1987). To him, individual life is subordinate to some higher cause and there 
innocent bystanders. Terrorism, according to Combs (1997), is an act comprised of at least 
r crucial elements: 
a. It is an act of violence. 
b. It has as political motive or goal. 
c. It is perpetrated against innocent persons. 
d. It is staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the 
desired result. 
addox (1991), Business Risks International's Eugene Mastgrangelo predicted 
t that year could "turn out to be the absolute zenith of terrorist incidents around 
ing or exceeding the pace set in 1984, the biggest year of terrorism to date". 
ternational found that there were 14 incidents directed against U.S. firms or 
ith U.S. corporations between January and June 1988. The damage during 
ed to $1.3 million. 
rding to Copelarid (1987), t e~or i s t  activity has been largely confined to known "trouble 
", but it is spreading around the world and now it appears even in Asia, which had been 
errorism against Americans. More than 85 well-organized groups around the 
ler~ce for political rather than purely criminal reasons. Some, such as the IRA 
, or Spain's ETA separatists, are drivenby national causes; some like the 
religious fanatiqs exploited ,by politicians; and others are extremist 
neo-Nazis of the French organhation, Action Directe. As Ambassador 
says, "Terrorism is war by proxy. It permits regimes to engage in 
ding retaliation." And it permits gangster to parade as legitimate soldiers 
jic fear will rise and fall with each ugly i.ncident. During lulls in terrorist activity, travel 
eases security becomes lax - until the next atrocity. The long-range trend is unmistakably 
Ward; terrorist incidents have been increasing and roughly 12% to 15% annually for the past 
Years. "There is no end in sight," says Brian M. Jenkins of the Rand Corp. He theorizes that 
terrorists v/ho begar; as idealists have hccn brutalized by the long struggle; the faint-beaned have 
dropped out or were shov,:d asidt: by more ruthless elen~cnts. Attacks are becoming more I 
ethal; terrorists havc shifted hrrn bombing &pty buildings to shooting large numbers of people, 
Killings of hostages, oilce relatively rare, are zxpected to become the nomi. 
Conditions under which terrorism seems to occur can be defined. According to Cladwin and 
Walter (1.980). by gathering and integrating a ilurnhel- of elements that various expefir and 
have suggested which arc reicvnnt tu the e a p l ~ a t i o n  of terrorism, one can begin to view 
the phenomenon as a matter of"'con:ingeiicies". 
s r- 
'The scheme suggested by b;lad\vin and Walter ( 1080) shows terrorist actions as a product, ot. 
three grciups of variables: 
b. Origins, irlctors that lie at the roots of terrorism itsclf; 
c. Objectives, factors that conspicuously serve tv inspire acts of terrorism; and 
c. Facilitators, factors that imply a presetice of support or an absence of impedinlents by 
outside agents. 
Terrorist n~otives differ widely horn case to case, as can be seen as followed: 
I .  World revolutio~a 
'Terrorists talk vaguely about anti-iml?erialisrn, anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, antl- 
Zionism, anti--Americanisw and so on, using such terms synonymously. And so MNC 
executives taken hostage are nsually branded "irnperiaIist agents" or "zapitalisl 
exploiters". Lf ie~;  Germany's Red Army Faction decided to strike a synlboi of 
capitalism, they went fiw the very top, abducting and murdering Dr. Hanns-Martin 
Schleyer, Preside~.~t 01' the West German ('onfederation of Employers Associations and 
a!so President of the Ft:deratio11 of' CYcst (.;ermati Industries. "The top boss in the 
country." stated a G e m a n  newspaper. After his murder, the terrorists announced that 
their targets fiorn !hen on woulcl be "capitalist profiteers and their lackeys." 
Accordirlg to Frornkin (Gladnrirl and \!alter, 1080), terronsnl can be viewed as "a hrm 
of nlass communication . theirs is campaign that needs publicity in order to s ~ c c r e d ,  
and therefore they have come to operate within the ambit of contemporary public 
relations and communicatior:~ arts: The ~ i , r l d  of cirlema. camp fashion, and P O P  I n  
which deadlines and prime-tinie are the chiof realities and in which shock value is the 
chief virtue." The fi~nctions of. self-advertisement inc!rlde undergound morale boostln9 
humiliating the target, ?lass educating o f  t lx  public, and gaining of the cause. 


















































()utragesaarc oitcn careti~lly- staged. and !;,reign rather than local firms are iieclliently 
chose~-i as targel s. 
'The ~hirst f ~ i  attcrli~on also accounts i;jr ihd l ' i . t . : q ~ i ~ r ~ ~  demand that bQ-iC's place full-pagc 
;Idvlr:rtise~nents publisisir~g tlie ten'c!;.i.;ts' manifesto in rhe local and foreign press a?; 
condition for the re!ease of a hostagt: cxecutivi:. For example, Daimler-Rerl~ A.G, 
denounced tile "cctsncj.rnic imperialir;~~~" of rr,~~ltinaticnals in deveidping countries in a 
of widcly-i.z~d fbrcign dailies ~!nclc!- orders from Argcntinc Montc.)neros hoitling 
I;ranz Metz, the company's industrial clirector in Argentina. 
,,, Social justice 
lncidcnts indicale that a certain proportion o f  te~rorism is tired by a sense of ":;ocial 
conscience". Katlli~r than passively accepting what they believe to be immoral corporate 
conduct, or \voi.king through established channels to change corporate policies, terrorists 
often take ~iiatters into theis own hands using sjnabolic attack. Accortiing ro Gladwin and 
Walter (1980), tc~-rorists have also assigned to the~useives "Robin tiood" roles, ofteri 
dema~idirlg ransor?is in  lie k~rm ol'fcwd and u!he: goods and services for the poor. 
v ,  Prisoner release 
On March 2!, 1072, gue~rillas of the People's I<cvolutionary Ammy, dressed in police 
unifo~nrs, kidnapped Ilr. Oherdsn Sallustro. head c11' the Fiat Concord plant in Argentina. 
The terrorists quickly issued half a do;len cc.,mmu~;iques demanding the release of 50 
"political prisoners". The military government of President Alejandro T,anusse firmly and 
quickly rejected the demand and rushed thi.oug11 an emergency decrec to prevent private 
companies or i~ldividunls irom subn~itting to "acts of extortion" (The Economist in 
Gladwin and \Naiter, I ?80), With :he yoverrlment's resistance, Fiat desperateiy tried tc; 
convince I;.I?J !o accept instead an r~nspecifieil i-ansc;ni, a pledge to remove polict: kom 
its (.'ordoba plant, $ 1  r?~illion i i i  food ancl clothing hr poor school children and a 
reinstatement of 250 employees who had heen dismissed. The terrorists stood t i m ,  
insisting on release of their colleagues. (.in April 10'" the police discovered the . . Icidnappcrs' tildeout in Bluenos Aires, ancl as thcy began closing in, Sallustro was 
murdered by his captors. 
Financing 
4'' 
Terrorists rieed rnor,ey. 1-arge sums aye required to finance clandestine headquarters, 
hideouts, gatcv:ay cars. ucapons pul'chases, travel, and "Robin I-Iood" distribution 
schemes. Kidnapping and robbery are 114etl to generate fiinds to f'inance the goals of 
tenri..;ts. In rnany of these cases, according to Ckteora and Graham ( 1  9991, the kfN<: is a 
source of rcady cash and is caught in the, middle of political/social disputes not 
specifically directed at it. According to an official estimates (Gladwin and Walter, I V l i O j ,  
the terrorist, group that kidnapped and evt.ntually murdered Schleyer spent nearly 
$100,000 on the six vehicles used, a number oS :'safe houscs" around Cologne, and the 
place where ile was held for six \veek:; in September and October of 1077. - 
AccordioS to Rartor ( 1  go?), haicd o n  an :inal~sis of' acts of telrorism and sabotage 
led at col~ora t ions  between I081 to 10'11, the lollowing conc l~~s ions  Can be drailln, ,qcls 
tel-rorisn~ and sabotage tend lo be: 
I 
a .  Intentional 
I a suss  
a They 
ham? 
Teryorisn~ differs from ac:cidents. silch as was the case with the I ir~ion Carbide Sas 
, The) 
le;!k at Dhopal. Kidnapping of cxt-cutives from large, well-known organizations j 
such as IBM, General Motors and other firms is often directly correlated not la nespite the 
the wealth of individual victims as much as to the wealth and power cf their ,19933).  
emplojlci-. Sabotage is rarely rar~dorii; disb~crntled employees and customers are 
, . SLl* 
most ciftcrl responsible for sel-ious dknagc inflicted in cases of damage ;, 31tacks mean 
computci. s:vs!ems, according to a 1089 surqey. 
rs- 
but sometin 
b. Mettlodically Targeted 
'l'cr~orism differs h r n  a gunman who r ~ ~ s h e s  into a restaurant and rarldomly 
shoots customers. When George [Tinnard killed 23 peopie on October 16, 1991 at 
Li~By's Killeen, Tcxas restaurant. police believe he did SO w i t h o ~ ~ t  a preconceived 
plan there war; no apparent "ax" to grind. This differs considerably from the 
January 1902 murder of a Japanese univt:rsi ty president who was rnurdered in his 
Boston, Mass Hotel suite. F'oiicc suspect tliai tht- victim, who was Japanese, was 
spc:~ificallg. targeted, altl.lough the rcasons remain unclear. Between January 1 and 
h,jay 2Ci. 1902, at lcast 10 Japanese esccutives were murdered while working 
abroad. 
C .  Motivated hy a Cause 
111 some cases. orr;anizatioris a:ld cxecutivc:: who are planning to operate a new 
plant irk a f i ) re ip  cour; t~y finti :hat local extremists do not want "capitalists" 
invading tlieir territory. In other cases, a icr~mrist strike against an American. 
British CI- b'atiadiail firm is seen as a "statemen: c;f inclepenslcnce" by guerrillas 
attached to any number (if organizations. 
FORMS OF TERRORISM 
There are Inany categorkat~on of terrorist aciion. -]'hey are kidnappirig, barricade and hostage, 
bombing, armed assault, assassination, and inccndiarl attacks According to Barton (1993a i .  
individual terrorist:; often s::lect large, multinational co!porations to pursue ransom or extol-tion 
gains, whereas poiiticnl alid state-sponsored ten-orism is t;,-pically motivated more out of 
perceived pc)litical gai:i. 'i'he Ihlltwing idcniities several of the nwst ciinimon motivating factors 
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b. They seek a change in the operations or leailershij. of ar? organization. 
C .  'They seek to polittcize the plight or their cause by targeting a popular individual. 
C .  They believe tf!,at violetlce, even against a third par-ty, may bring needed pblicity t@ one 
struggle or another. 
They seek: C!: 11nde1-131ne puhlic con~idencc in a ccjn;pany, org:~nization or c<,~lntry h\, 
i assass( nating a ieacler or injuring 3 ccitnpan:q' reputstion. 
They use calculated Incans to rnakc i t  seern as i fanot l~cr  part]; was responsible [he 
!. ham they in tlitrt. 
-r]le)i seek to cilrect i;cnnornic gain vi:) ~:xtor~.iori. 
1. 
the visual ill-ipxt of i:iia~ci:nt victims hcitig iri~iiiecl or killed, according to Banon 
Ilgq3a), Il~ost errorist attacks occi.lr against business ptrst-,ns traveling in politically unstable 
;ounties s ~ 1 ~ 1 i  as il'nlll~r~bia, !igai-[cia. Sudan and t:lse\vhe:e; sometimes these are calculated 
,rtacks meant to warn oC!'an Arnericrm or other hreign entities not to pursue further investmefit, 
jul 
they (10 not appear to be part ~ 1 '  any u~.ches~rated or "nlessage-orientedW 
1,efiist @oL!~s, rigiitisr groups, pr-o-indcpcndence groups - the entire ganlfit of 
or rciigious C i i l I i s S  appears to inspire tcrnirist ac.tivititx as nluch as geed and 
disorciei-s. 
lerrorists do not aln:ays demand money for their hostages. (Iften, demands include food 
,jijtfibution to the poor- s o  the terrorists' is boosted. anlong the group they seek to empress. In 
other cases, tcrroris:~ rxav dernand the publication or  broadcast of their political messages as we 
hive discussed in the earlier part. This type nf recjuest alsc? occurred in I..iruguay, where the 
Tuparrlaros seized 211 American advisor (Kclly, 1073 in K-elly and Barnathan, 1988). When a 
lerrorist campaign becoriles dcspcrate, it  may seek. lo  demonstrate its power by utidern~iriing the 
government. Ls such a cast? its denlands may be ir~erely synlbolic and impossible to meet, and 
victims may simply tre executed. According to Kelly (,Kelly and Banlathan. 1988), (he Red 
Brigades in l:aly, the Vietcong in Indochina, anti various Arab terrorist organizations in the 
Middle East have killed their victirn:; to artract wcx-ldwide attention to their causes and also to 
convince people !list the govc:mrnent is helpless be f iw a dedicated revolutionary force. In fact, 
the majority of attacks against itmericans tend to direct at embassy personnel ant1 other 
government. I-Iowever. as these targels became hardened with stepped-up security that made 
them less vulnerable to attack, terrorists chose softer victims, such as innocent tourists and 
American coipoi-ate en~ployces. 
No doubt, many of [hese acts are consciously orchestrated to enhance their media appeal. Media 
exposure enhances the power an[! prestige of  the per-petrators of such depraved behavior-. I11 the 
eves of the terrorists thcrnselves, w~ch activity is heroic and patriotic. 'Thc Moro kidnapping by 
h e  Italian Red Brigatles iri 1978, the Iranian hostage crisis (1079-1C)81), and the hijacking of 
TWA Flight 747 in 1085 are prominent examples of such events (Kelly and Hamathan, 1988). 
)lore than 40% of the teisorist targets was U.S. businf<?es. Nevertl-ieless, .American companies 
are not the only ones suscepiible to an organizational crisis caused by terrorism. Japanese finns 
have also been increaiingly targeted by terrorist ( & - t o n ,  1993). Figul-e 1 o fk rs  insight into just . . 
of the more pronlineiit cases that Japanese firn:sIlave faced in recent years. 
, Figure 1 -- 
SELECTED ACTS OF TKRRORFSM I-IGAIINST JAPANESE C O N C E ~ S  
Target Date ‘4cts 
NEC 1985 Kidnapping, Iran 
I'iitachi 1980 . , T\vo engineers wounded, Iran 
Rank of 'l'skyo 1957 t3onlb1 ng 
a'- 
Sony 1989 Repeated botnb threats, worldwide 
.Japan Air Lines 1989 Blackma11 in Reij~ng, China office 
BC'CliJapan linlts 1991 1 elephone and mail threats 
Japan University I 092 President murdered in Boston, MA 
Sourct:: t3arton, L. ( 1  093a). Mlhy Uusinesscs Must Prepare a Strategic Kcsponsc to 
('orpoi-aie Sabotage. 1nilu:;tn:ll hlanagernent. Vol. 35. Issue 2, pp.  I. 7. 
THE IMPACT OF 'I'ERRORISNI ON BUSINESS COI~IB~IUNITY ABROAD 
The visiblc costs often-orisin are loss of life, property danlage, casualties? ransom, and extortion 
payments. Personne! in a fimm victimized by terrorists may experience a diminishcd sense of 
morale coupled with feelings of humiliation and hopelessness (Kelly and Rarnathan, 1988). Thc 
effect of 3 kidnapping on spCiuses and children n ~ x y  be par.ticularly acute. Unlike ordinary 
kidnappers and other career crin:inals who hold indiv~duals against their will, many terrorists 
receive highly pl.ofe:;sional training -- or (rain themselves - io resist psychological, finmcial, and 
political concessions negotiators may offer. l o  compromise, to five in, is to betray the cause that 
means more to t1ier11 tlwn life ilseif'(Kel1y and Ral-nathan, 1088). 
Dealing with the threat oi' te~-rons:~~: which generally sceks to shut down prc,ductiol; or disrupt 
corporate operations, rnay be as expensive as actual terrorist acts (Kelly and Bamalhan. 19881. 
IBM, for example, which operates in 130 countries and employs local nationals, spent more than 
$100 million in 1985 on security (Rosetti, 1986 in Kelly and Ramathan, 1988). ..2s dipiomatic, 
and military installations increase their security, terrorists may be expected to search out more 
vulnerable targets. 
These may include not onjy personnel but also computer records and systems and the 
manufa~turing infrastructure. FCIV f i i ~ l ~  could c o n t l n : ~ ~  to stay in business I T  the11 vltal 
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Inleresting]y, the mosi illiportant 11-ainin2 Ii)r fbi.<ign uinpioyees was handling weapons and tlow 
lo 
bring kidnajlpiil. 11 could h~ irlfz~icd thi~l  thcir primacy pui-pi)se was to protect 
txp 
atriatc managers anti not  neccssari!;i their fatriilies ur foreign managers. There did not appear . . 
[,be a systemn!ic program for ~ntegrating t!:~ cx;.;utivc, [he family members and tile activities of  
die,wC One coulii t:i~ncluiIe that iht; MNC give:; rralning and then it is tile executive's problem 
; If ten.onsts k~dnap the executive or take over ~o rpora t e  facilities. The infmnation and 
n,gotiati"n skills neccisary to prevent terrorist attacks ef'ibctively and the training necessary to . , ve a terrorist attack succcssfu!iy appear to be two glaring omissions in MNCs' training rbs 1 
programs. 
I Guide to Persc,noel ,\dministrator. 
The trainer 01- personnel adrninistraior planning to design an orientation program for 
international travelers or expatriates should heglri with one essential step a meeting wi th  
corporate security. According LO Copeland ( 1'-i87), most multinational corporations have a. 
security of'ljfice stafi'ed by formcr I'RI, C I A ;  military or private security professionals 
experienced in a l i  izccts of  security managemt.nt and well traveled. 'fhey have access to 
databases speciaiizing in tcrrnrisrn intelligence a n d  should be able to tell you immediately 
the situation anyw~~e~-h :  in the world. I'he major probiem in a large mrrltinational corporation 
is not so mach learning what c v ~  need to know,  but communicating that information to those 
who need to know i t .  Thrs is whcrc human resource professionals can help. Managcrs who 
believe their emp1oyt:es or theil- physical plants could be targeted for terrorist attack should 
take action steps suggested by 13arton (1993a), including: 
a. Make decisions based upona the poliiical landscape. 
I t  is important to rcad area newspapers and regularly review various databases offered by 
security management and risk asscssnnent fim~s. in many cases, a terrorist stnkes smaller 
targets tirst and, breeding upon that sirccess. seeks pliblicity by pursuing more prominent 
targets for attack or exrortion. 
b .  IJnderstand the rtoles of terrorism. 
I f  your conij~any is operating in Iray, Chile, the Philippines, Cuba and a number of other 
politically volatile countries, you shor.rld know *advance the rules about paying ransom 
or other. fornt of extortion. Es tabl i sh~d relationships with area law enforcement 
authorities could help or hurt; only by eviiluating the specific situation in that region in 
advance could you best detenninc the prudeni action. 
C. Ptarchase kidnap insurance 
There has been a proliferation in- the numbcr oC Gnns offering kidnapping and ransom 
(K&R) insurance. T'nese policies cover losses incuned by ransom paid and for salaries 
for hostages whiic. they are being held against their will, as well as covering costs 
sssociaieJ with ;m internatior~al crisis rn~tnagement firnl. For an extra Prt.n,iUm 
ciirporations can a150 cover thcnlsclvrs against product recall. negotiator fees, legal coSi; 
and ransom paid tc) kidnappsrs. - 
According to M a i ~ o n ~ y  (1993). ~a rv ' a rd  Business School and Yale School of B ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~  
and Management have cli:termii~ed that 40-60 percent O f  US multinational corporat,c,ns 
purchase kidnapirinsorn insural~ce, l ' h o u ~ h  both [.loj/ds of London and The Americall 
IntoXational Group have offered ki~lna~;/~-ansorn insurance to executives for many 
only recently havt: (IS cotnpanies expandcd coverage ~o all emploj~ees and to a broad 
spectrum of  corporate activities rclated to handling crisis. 'l'hus, policies can now 
cc,l.erage of execulivzs' relatives and corporate, guests, insurance on delivery of ranson, 
fees for 1ndependt:nt negotiators a:; ncedeci, intercsi on bank loans for ransom, hotel arl,j 
rt:lnted expenses ii,r the hostase's firnib;", costs of newspaper advertisements and o!Iler 
demarlds of the kidnappers. and caul?. expenses for suits related to th, 
co~npany 's  handliug (if  thr: incidenl. 
i i .  lrnplen~enti~~g an A~:areness Program 
specialist 










Managers are iaged to consider the t1cc;ision-making model as the foundation for c0rporate-wide in high-ri: 
study of this issue (Barton. 1993). ':'he first stage oi' the nioctel, "Research", encourages both 
. . 
internal and cxternal analys~s  into the security status quo; this process will be illuminating i n  
cxposing areas of orgarlizntional vulnerability. The second stage, "Decision making", prompts 
managers to de te~mine  what activities a!-c cost-effective and necessary give11 any identified 
security weaknesses. Finaliy, the third stage, "Evaluation", demands that this process become 
permanent. This is best achieved when senior nianagers appoint. a task force representing various 
interests in the organizritlon. 'Phis curt: group is then commissioned to periodically evaluate the 
strengths, weaknesses., opporl.uniries and thrcnts inherent in this process. 
i i i .  Crisis hilanagenaetlt Response 
Clrisis Management 'Learn (CM'T) iirsi shouci dcvelop an accurate picture of the terrorist 
threat. In conducti~lg an initial sa~rve!/. !he C'M'T' should try to look at the firm fiom a 
terrorist's perspcctivc.. Kelly and I3arnatha1.1 ( ' 1  988) suggested that the questions guiding the 
assessment should include the following: 
a.  Who are the terrorists? 
b. What ar-e their annou~ici:.ri aims (money, public exposure, political goals)? 
c .  ?Pihat are their methotis (bombings, assassiuatior! of public figures, random attacks 
against the civiiian popuiation'.' 
d. 'What specltic demands have thcy made of t h e ~ r  kictims In the past? 
e. How nmny of tltcir vlct~rns have been killed, saved by rescuers. or released? 
f. Whom do thcy ordinarily seive (top cifljcers o f  business f jnns,  people from the rnhtaly 


























[-Tow much s!.ipport do the ten-or!sts enjoy among other dissident Fdctions (intellectuals, 
~lnl\~crsity students. Izbor ~ ~ n ~ o n s ) ' ?  
specialists ii; t e z ~ r i s l n  ~ f f ~  one sor!nd co~liiusloil: i f  a lirrr! is susceptible to terrorism because 
it has a high profile both at hornc and ;ibr.oatl, if i t  is involvec! in politically controversial 
product itec.elo~irnerit/s!~ipmc~~ts, i t  coiild h c  largeted (Barton, 1993). Similady, if an 
oleanizatjon is q~lickl\/ synrinyrnolls w ~ t h  a par;icula: religion, ethnic goup/politica] cause, a - 
iecurity firm that specializes in t.cr;.i)risn! shoc~ld be erlgaged to conduct an audit o f  areas o f  
I t  is ooly often that management can fully assess what steps, if any, the 
nray ~vish t c )  take to avert a potentially cicadly encounrcr with crisis. Although there 
can be no guarantees agains,t tenorism, but 3 c ~ t ~ i p e i l i i l ~  case can be made for prevention 
programs, which might forcs terrorists to think twicc before acting. By keeping well informetf of 
[erronst activities, by curtailing unnecessary pers<!nnel exposure in areas where terrorist 
are rampant, and by upgriliiing prote:;?ive measures for essential personnej who reside 
in high-risk areas, conqxmies car] sharply retluce the frequency of incidents. 
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